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J. RODNEY JOHNSON

Interspousal Property Rights At Death
(You can't take it with you, but you can prevent your spouse from getting any of it.)

Introduction
ONE of the major issues in Virginia law during the
past decade has been the matter of property rights
upon the termimttion of a marriage by divorce. Now
that the concept of equitable distribution has been
introduced into Virginia law in order to bring about a
greater degree of fairness into this area, it is time to
direct the focus of law reform to a parallel issueinterspousal property rights when a marriage is terminated by death. The importance of this issue to
large numbers of Virginians is obviou~ when one
stops to realize that, notwithstanding the dismal statistics on the increasing incidence of divorce, the typical Virginia marriage still continues until it is dissolved by the death of one of the parties. The
exposure of this majority of married persons to potential economic problems is also obvious when one
stops to realize that, under Virginia law, a su~:ving
spouse has absolutely no rights in the deceased
spouse's estate (except as the deceased spouse has
allowed them to be created). 1 The purposes of this
article are (i) to demonstrate the accuracy of this
assertion concerning the lack of rights of a surviving
spouse undPr Virginia law, (ii) to call attention to a
serious internal conflict between this Virginia law
and Virginia's announced public policy concerning
the institution of marriage, and (iii) to urge that the
recently aborted legislative study dealing with interspousal property rights at death be resurrected in the
1985 session of the General Assembly.
Intestate Succession
Nowhere in the law of intestate succession has the
change from the common law to the present law been
more dramatic than in the case of a surviving spouse.
Under the common law canons of descent a surviving
spouse was never an heir; an intestate's real estate
would escheat to his feudaul overlord before it would
pass to his widow. This common law prohibition was
eliminated in Virginia's first statute of descent, effective January 1, 1787, which made the surviving
spouse an heir in step ten. From this meager begin10

ning, the General Assembly subsequently moved the
surviving spouse's position in intestate succession of
real property up to step four in 1922, to step two in
1956, and finally to step one in 1982.2 This latter position, step one, is also the position that the surviving
spouse occupies in the distribution of personal property in intestate succession. 3 Notwithstanding this
dramatic improvement of the surviving spouse's
position i.n intestate succession, the fact remain a that
this position continues to be classified as an "expectancy", as opposed to a "right", and a person can
easily prevent the operation of these intestate succession laws by simply writing a will or, as will be
explained later, by causing his property to pass by
way of various probate avoidance devices. Thus it is
clear that a surviving spouse has absolutely no rights
in the deceased spouse's estate under the laws of
intestate succession, except as the deceased spouse
has allowed such rights to be created by (i) dying
without a will and (ii) leaving assets that pass by
intestate succession.

Rights Upon Renunciation of A Will
It is common knowledge that when a married person dies testate the surviving spouse has a statutory
right to renounce the will and take a forced share of
the decedent's personal propert:·. The issue to be
addressed, however, is not the surviving spouse's
right to renounce the decedent's will but, instead,
what rights does the surviving spouse thereby acquire
in the decedent's personal property? Code 64.1-16 sets
forth the rights that accrue to the surviving spouse as
follows:
Ifrenunciation be made, the surviving spouse
shall, if the decedent left surviving children
or their descendants, have one third of the
decedent's personal estate mentioned in
§64.1-11; or if no children or their descendants survive, the surviving spouse shall
have one half of such surplus; otherwise the
surviving spouse shall have no more of the
surplus than is given him or her by the will.

Although the fractional share of the renouncing
spouse varies according to whether or not the decedent left surviving children or their descendants, the
base against which that fraction is to be applied is
always the same. The statute very clearly identifies
this base as the decedent's net probate personal estate, i.e., that part of the decedent's personal property
that passes to his personal representative and which
remains after all debts, taxes and expenses have been
paid. To state the rather obvious then, if there is no
net probate estate the net "rights" of the surviving
spouse amount to nothing. And therein lies the problem because, as even the neophyte estate planner can
testify, it is possible to have the benefit of and control
over any amount of personal property for the entirety
of one's life and still prevent any of it from being
included in one's probate estate following his death.
Witness all of the popular literature dealing with how
to avoid probate.
Dillon v. Gow 4 is a highly instructive trial court
decision showing the application of the foregoing
principle to this matter of interspousal property
rights at death. In this case Mr. Dillon suffered a
coronary thrombosis on Saturday, August 20, 1955,
and was immediately admitted to the Medical College
of Virginia. The following Monday, August 22, he
summoned his attorney to his bedside and thereupon
executed a previously prepared inter-vivos trust of
$250,000.00 (book value) worth of stock in a close corporation. Under the terms of this trust, Mr. Dillion
retained (i) the right to all income from the trust fund
for life, and (ii) the right to appoint the corpus of the
trust to anyone in the world except to himself, his
estate, or his creditors (the corpus would go to his
daughter and her family if this power was not exercised). Mr. Dillon died on September 3, 1955, twelve
days after he created this trust. Suit was thereafter
initiated to determine, among other things, whether
Mrs. Dillrn would receive any portion of this trust
fund if she should renounce her husband's will and
demand her statutory forced share in his personal
estate. The court held that Mrs. Dillon had no rights
in this trust fund. True she would be entitled to onethird of Mr. Dillon's net probate personal estate upon
the renunciation of his will. However, the court concluded that Mr. Dillon had parted irrevocably with all
but a life estate at the time he executed the trust, and
his retained life estate expired with him leaving no
vestige of this stock in his probate estate. In coming
to his judgment in this case, Judge Lamb found the
Virginia law to have been settled, since 1813, that "as
to his personal property, a man could waste it, destroy it or give it away; that during the continuance
of the marriage the wife had no interest in the prop-
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erty such as would entitle her to claim a fraud if the
husband should in his lifetime divest himself of title,
put it beyond his reach so that he could not recover it
himself." 5 Judge Lamb went on to note that "I have
no doubt that the first statement of that principle of
law comes as a surprise, if not a shock, to the general
run of the thoughts of the community, but our laws
have always recognized what has been spoken of as
the sacredness of (personal) property and the complete dominion of the owner." 11
The issue in Dillon that appeared to worry the court
the most was the effect, if any, to be given to Code
55-BC which voids transfers made" ... with intent to
delay, hinder or defraud creditors, purchasers or
other persons of or from what they are or may be
lawfully entitled to (emphasir added) ... " Judge
Lamb concluded that existing precedents prevented
him, at the trial court level, from making an in depth
11

review of this issue. However, this troublesome point
was laid to rest four years later by the Virginia
Supreme Court, in Freed v. Judith Realty Corp., 7
wherein the court held as follows:
The fact that Freed's purpose in executing
the trust ... may have been to prevent his
wife from obtaining any part of the trust
property at his death through operation of
the statute of descent and distribution if he
died intestate or through renunciation of his
will if he died testate, does not render the
trust invalid. 8
In Freed, the court also reaffirmed its earlier holdings that "a married man enjoyed during his lifetime
the unqualified privilege to dispose of his personal
estate whatever be his purpose in doing so, provided
that he so dispossess himself of it as to put it beyond
his power to reclaim (emphasis added)," 9 Thus the
emphasized proviso in the preceding sentence represents the only restriction upon the married person
who wishes to eliminate the forced statutory share of
his surviving spouse by reducing his probate personal
estate to zero through the use of various probate avoidance devices-the probate avoidance device
that is chosen may not be one that leaves it within the
power of the transferor to recover the property. It is
permissible to retain (i) a life estate in the property, (ii)
a degree of administrative control over the property,
and (iii) a non-general power of appointment over the
property which will enable the transferor to change
the identity of the ultimate owner of the property up to
the moment of the transferor's death, but the transferor may not reserve the right to recover the property
himself.
It is clear from the emphasized language in Freed,
above, that where one has made gratuitous lifetime
transfers of personal property that are not "beyond
his power to reclaim" at the time of his death such
personal property will be treated as if it is still the
transferor's for the purpose of determining the surviving spouse's forced statutory share. The t~rm "augmented estate" has been coined to identify this
concept whereiu personal property that is clearly not
in the probate estate is nevertheless treated as being
in the probate estate for the purpose of computing the
forced statutory share of a renouncing spouse. Illustrative transfers that would be included in a decedent's augmented estate under present Virginia law
are revocable trusts, "joint" bank accounts (to the
extent of the decedent's deposits), joint and survivorship property (insofar as the half that could be rP.covered is concerned), P.O.D. bank accounts, Totten
Trust bank accounts, causu mortis gifts, and any
12

other revocable, inter-vivos transfer of personal
property.
It may be argued that thiR augmented estate concept operates as a significant impediment to one who
wishes to prevent his surviving spouse from receiving
any of his personal property at death because it effectively limits the probate avoidance devices that he
may safely use to only two, absolute gifts and irrevocable trusts, neither of which is particularly desirable.
Assuming for the sake of argument that there is any
undesirability associated with these two probate
avoidance devices, nevertheless that does not in any
way help to establish the proposition that the present
augmented estate concept is a significant impediment
to the scheming spouse. It must be remembered that
the augmented estate concept comes into operation
only when one is determining the forced share of a
surviving spouse who has renounced the decedent's
will and, to again state the obvious, if the decedent
dies intestate there is no right to a statutory forced
share. Accordingly, one may place his personal property in any one or more of the revocable probate avoidance devices mentioned above and then, by simply
dying intestate, thereby prevent the survivi.1g spouse
from claiming any portion of this property under the
augmented estate concept. Although the spouse may
now be in position number one under intestate succession, if there will not be any property passing by
intestate succession (because it is all passing by varinus probate avoidance devices) she will still receive
nothing. Thus, notwithstanding the existence of the
forced statutory share legislation and the judicially
created concept of the augmented estate, the fact
remains that the surviving spouse thereby obtains
absolutely no rights in the deceased spouse's personal
property except as the deceased spouse has allowed
such rights to be created by (i) dying with a will, and
(ii) leaving personal property that is either in his probate estate or is treated as being in his probate estate
under the augmented estate concept.

Dower & Curtesy
Although, as noted earlier, a decedent's spouse was
never an heir at common law, the common law did
prov1de for a husband to have a curtesy interest in his
wife's real property and for a wife to have a dower
interest in her husband's real property. Though
changed in form and content since the common law,
the institutions of dower and curtesy are continued in
Virginia today by Code 64.1-19, which reads in relevant part as follows:
A surviving spouse shall be entitled to a
dower or curtesy interest in fee simple of one

third of all the real estate whereof the
deceased spouse or any other to his use was
at any time seized during coverature of an
estate of interitance, unless such right shall
have been lawfully barred or relinquished
(emphasis added).
It must be admitted that if a man is seized of an
"estate of inheritance" in "real estate" while he is
married, there is no way that he can prevent his
wife's inchoate dower interest therein from becoming
a possessory estate upon his death. However, it is
quite simple to acquire, use, and be able to convey
any quantity of real property during marriage without being seized of an "estate of inheritance" in "real
estate." The essential element of most such schemes
is either (i) to acquire the real estate through a corporation or a partnership (instead of acquiring the real
estate in one's own name) which will result in one
owning personal property instead of "real estate " or
(ii) to acquire the real este.te as joint tenants with the
right of survivorship with another which will prevent
one from being seized of an "estate of inheritance"
(during the joint tenancy).
Linking this discussion with the preceding one, it is
easy to see how one can form a corporation through
which he can acquire whatever real estate he might
wish and then place the corporate stock in an appropriate probate avoidance device, thereby being able to
acquire, use and convey the real estate in question as
freely &Fl a fee simple owner and yet prevent hiR surviving spouse from having any dower therein (because
the stock is personal property) or any forced statutory
share therein (because of the probate avoidance
device). Thus the validity of the statement that the
surviving spouse has absolutely no rights in the
deceased spouse's real estate under the laws of dower
and curtesy, except as the deceased spouse has
allowed such rights to be created by acquiring real
estate as such, as opposed to acquiring the same real
estate in a manner that will result in his ownership
being characterized as personal property.
In addition to the foregoing, it has been possible
since common law times to create a special estate in
real estate in a woman, in which any surviving husband would not be entitled to curtesy. This estate,
usually referred to as the "equitable separate estate,"
is provided for in Virginia today by Code 64.1-21,
which reads as follows:
A surviving husband shall not be entitled to
curtesy in the equitable separate estate of the
deceased wife if such right thereto has been
expressly excluded by the instrument creating the same, or if such instrument, executed

heretofore or hereafter, describes the estate
as her sole and separate equitable estate.
In Jacobs v. Meade, decided by the Virginia Supreme
Court on April 27, 1984, it was claimed that this stat·
ute "is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds
because the statute fails to grant husbands the same
rights granted wives." 10 The court did not reach the
constitutional issue in this case, however, due to the
existence of Code 64.1-19.1, enacted by the General
Assembly in 1977 apparently as a response to various
decisions of the United States Supreme Court involving gender-based classifications. Code 64.1-19.1
provides:
Where the word "curtesy" appears in this
chapter of the Code, it shall be taken to be
synonymous with the word "dower" as the
same appears in this chapter or this Code,
and shall be so construed for all purposes.
The court held that "when construed with§ 64.1-19.1,
§ 64.1-21 provides that a surviving wife shall not be
entitled to dower in the equitable separate estate of
the deceased husband if such right thereto has been
expressly excluded by the instrument creating the
same, or if such instrument describes the estate as his
sole and separate equitable eRtate (emphasis in
original)."11
As a result of the Jacobs decision, it is no longer
necessary for a married person who wishes to defeat
any dower or curtesy rights of the surviving spouse in
real estate to go through the somewhat cumbersome
process of converting the real et1tate to personal property prior to acquisition and then holding such personal property in a probate avoidance device at the
time of death. Now it is possible for a married person,
male or female, to acquire real estate directly as an
equita hie separate estatt · nd thereby prevent the
surviving spouse from having any dower or curtesy
rights therein. A fortiori, then, the validity of the
statement that the s1·.rviving spouse has absolutely
no rights in the deceased spouse's real property under
the laws of dower and curtesy, except as the deceased
spouse has allowed such rights to be created by
acquiring real property as a legal estate, as opposed
to an equitable separate estate.

Public Policy Regarding Marriage
The Virginia Supreme Court has declared that "it is
the policy of the law to foster and protect marriage, to
encourage the parties to live together and to prevent
separation, marriage being the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress." 12 Acting pursuant
13

to this policy, the court has declared that agreements
between husbands and wives are "void when they
tend to encourage or facilitate separation or divorce."13 With this as a background, and without
going through the exercise of creating an elaborate
hypothetical fact situation, let the reader simply
assume an older, female client whose marriage is
effectively dead but who is hesistant about seeking a
no-fault di rnrce for family reasons, religious reasons,
etc. Before responding to her request for advice you
determine that her husband has been the sole or
primary wage-earner during their marriage and that
almost all of "their" property, acquired during the
mariage, is in his name. How do you advise her? Do
you explain that if she does go forward with the
divorce she will be able to obtJ.lin monetary compensation for her share of the marital property under
Virginia's equitable diRtribution law but that, if she
decides to honor her marriage vows "until death do us
part," she may receive none of this marital property
upon her husband's death except as he so wishes?
Will this knowledge of the present state of the law
tend to encourage your client to seek the divorce? Is
the present state of the law consistent with the declaration of Virginia's public policy regarding marriage
that is contained in the first sentence of this
paragraph?

Law Reform
By way of response to concerns similar to those
raised in this article, the 1983 Session of the General
Assembly passed Senate Joint Resolution No. 51, 14
which created a joint subcommittee
... to study the body of present Virginia law
as it affects the transfer of property at death,
whether by will or intestacy, to determine
whether the rights of a surviving spouse are
adequately protected, to study the effect during lifetime and at death of the present
dower and curtesy provisions, and to study
the concept of an elective share and an augmented estate as a means to protect a surviving spouse from disinh1:..itance by dll or by
elimination of property from the probate estate ...
The subcommittee created by SJR No. 51 reported
back to the 1984 Session of the General Assembly
that a majority of its members "agreed that there
were problems with exiqting law, but could not agree
on the best method to correct them." 15 Therefore,
"(r)ecognizing t1'at the substantial work done during
the course of this study had not resulted in a concrete
14

legislative proposal for protecting the surv1vmg
spouse, on a 6-4 vote of the members present, the joint
subcommittee recommend(ed) that the study continue."16 House Joint Resolution No. 54 17 was accordingly introduced into the 1984 Session of The General
Assembly to provide for a one-year extension. HJR
No. 54 passed the House of Delegates by a vote of95-1,
and then died in the Senate Rules Committee.

Conclusion
Although this article has been written from the
standpoint of illustrating how easily a married person can prevent his surviving spouse from receiving
any portion of his estate, it must not be assumed that
the problem is confined to cases of intentional schemers. The problem is much broader than that and consequently affects far more persons. As reported by the
SJR 51 Subcommittee, "changes in the tax laws and
the ways in which people hold the majority of their
wealth have made it easier to intentionally or unintentionally disinherit one's spouse (emphasis
added)." 18
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully
submitted'(i) that for far to long an intolerable situation has existed in the area of interspousal property
rights at death, (ii) that this situation has now been
made even worse by the recent decision in Jacobs v.
Meade, and (iii) that it is incumbent upon the 1985
Session of the General Assembly to take positive
action towards protecting the legitimate expectations
of a surviving spouse under Virginia law.

FOOTNOTES

1. For convenience throughoui this article, the surviving

spouse will be assumed to be the wife and the first to die will be
assumed to be the husband. Except as specifically noted, how·
ever, the Jaws in this area are gender neutral today and thus
what is said about the position of one is also true of the other, if
the order of their deathR be reversed.
2. This is true "unless the intestate is survived by children or
their descendants, one or more of whom are not children or their
descendants of the surviving spouRe, in which case such estate
shall pass to the intestate's children and their rlescendants s1.1bject to the provisions of§ 64.1-19." Code 64.1-1.
:J. This is true unless the intestate is survived by children or
their descendants, one or more of whom are not children or their
descendants of the su1'Viving spouse, in which case the surviving spouse is entitled to only one-third. Code 64.1-11.
4. 2 OpinionB of Brockenbrough Lamb 78 (Richmond Ch.
1956).
5. Id .. at83.
6. Id.
7. 201 Va. 791 (1960).
8. Id .. at 795-6.

(continued on page 19)

tutte such disputes as may later arise are a bargained-for, integral part of the entire agreement. In
the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary,
they should be performed. The perceived cost containment and speed of arbitration, as compared to
litigation, should not be lost by allowing litigation of
the condition-precedent issue. Delay in enforcement
of the intent to arbitrate perverts the goals of
arbitration.
It is time for legislative review of the venerable
laws of Virginia used to determine the enforceability
offuture-dispute agreements. Section 8.01-577 and the
common-law, condition-precedent concept may no
longer meet the needs of the business community in
its quest for a viable alternative to litigation. Legal
scholars should contemplate these laws and share
their observations with those who seek to appreciate
the parameters of enforcement given the present
state of the law. Legislators should deliberate before
amending the existing law in order to make sure that
future amendments accord with the need to know
with reasonable certainty whether or not specific
promises to arbitrate future disputes will be enforced.
In this connection, the Uniform Arbitration Act
deserves special attention. 21 Its provisions do not differentiate in enforcement policy between existingand future-dispute agreements. 22 As mentioned, it
has already been adopted by over half of the fifty
states.

lnterspousal Property Rights ...
(continued from page 14)
9. Id., at 796.
10. _Va.~ 227 VRR 304, at :ms (1984).
11. Id .. at 308-9.
12. Capps v. Capps, 216 Va. 378, at :J80 (1975).
13. Id.
14. SJR No. 51 (198:H is reproduced as APPENDIX A to
Senate Document No. 9 ( 1984), Interim Report of thr Joint Suh·

FoarNOTEs
1. Acts of 1789 of the General Asa;~mbly of Va. ch. 46, as
found in 1 Rev. Code of 1803 (Va.) ch. Lli, llt 49-50; (As pointed
out in Preface to the 1803 Code, the 1792 Revised Code was
fraught with "augmenting imperfection" and ill indexed; therefore, the 1803 Code is relied on for the text of the Act.)
2. 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 484 (1858).
3. Note, supra, note 1.
4. Note, supra, note 1.
5. Va. Coda,§ 8.01-577 (Rep!. Vol. 1977) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
6. Supra, note 2.
7. 137 Va. 34, 120 S.E. 247 (1923).
8. 156 Va. 476, 159 S.E. 82 (1931).
9. 271 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1959).
10. 213 Va. 489, 193 S.E.2d 662 (1973).
11. C.A. 79-3::13-A (E.D. Va., August 1, 1979).
12. Id. at 2.
13. 9 U.S.C. § 1-14 (West Supp. 1983).
14. Supra, note 5, Paragraph B.
15. Supra, note 5, last Paragraph.
16. 30 No. 8 Va.B.News 37 (Febr1Jary 1982).
17. See Cannon, Mark W., Contentious and Burdensome Litigation: A Need for Alternatives, LXIII No. 4 Nat'! Forum 10
(Fall 1983).
18. Supra, note 5, Paragraph A.
19. H.B. 960 (1984 Session), continued to the 1985 Session in
committee.
20 See Stern, Stewart A., Enforceability of Agreements to
Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 Cardoza L. Rev. 481 (1981); see also Wehringer, Cameron K., Arbitration Precepts and Principles at 22-30 (1969).
21. Uniform Arbitration Act (1956).
22. Id.§ 1.
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